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I. INTRODUCTION
In fiscal year 2018, the federal government will provide American
small businesses with nearly billions of dollars in contract opportunities and
targeted assistance.1 Among such contracts, the government reserves and
allocates substantial sums of contract dollars for small businesses run by
historically-disadvantaged individuals, such as minorities and women.2
Unfortunately, individuals (referred to as “white collar criminals”) steal
hundreds of millions of dollars annually from various government programs
by means of fraud, embezzlement or improper disbursement.3 Sentencing
white collar criminals creates challenging issues for the courts, including

*J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S. in Criminal Justice,
Northeastern University, 2013. The author would like to thank Professor John Kip Cornwell
for his guidance during the drafting process and Nick McClelland for going above and beyond
in his role as his Circuit Review Journal Mentor.
1
USASPENDING.GOV, https://www.usaspending.gov/#/agency/803 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2018).
2
See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2016); 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15 (2014).
3
Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White-Collar Criminals?, 61
WAYNE L. REV. 343 (2015) (defining “white collar criminals” as unique because they share
several distinct characteristics: they are typically white, older, and better educated with no
prior criminal history); see Rick Moran, SBA Inspector General Uncovers Fraud in the 8(a)
Program, ASSOCIATION OF PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS,
http://www.aptac-us.org/news/sba-ig-uncovers-8a-fraud/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2018); see also
Michelle McVicker, The Real Cost of DBE Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 1, 8 (2016) (stating
that the largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136
million dollars over 15 years).
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how to punish behavior not immediately recognizable as criminal, since
fraud crimes often implicate amorphous victims.4 Without reforming the
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ (the “Guidelines”) Comment
Application Notes (the “Notes”), the small business procurement market of
individual minority and women business owners will continue to suffer
harm.5
Circuit courts use two major approaches to calculate loss when
criminals steal money intended for minority or women businesses: the
“general loss” rule and the “government benefits” rule.6 As a result, a circuit
split exists between circuit courts that apply the general loss rule, and those
that apply the government benefits rule.7 The decision as to whether to apply
the general loss rule or the government benefits rule matters because an
individual can defraud the government, but be subject to considerably
different punishments based on the circuit in which the fraud is tried.8 For
example, under the general loss rule, if small business owner A defrauds the
government of one million dollars and uses some of the funds for legitimate
purposes, he will have the legitimate services subtracted from the one million
dollars awarded. Importantly, owner A will see a reduction in prison time
because he performed on the contract to some extent. In contrast, if small
business owner B defrauds the government of one million dollars deemed to
be “government benefits,” B will owe the entire one million dollars in
restitution and be sentenced as such, regardless of any legitimate services
provided. Therefore, dramatic discrepancies in federal sentencing breed
unfairness and injustice, and reinforce the need for a uniform sentencing
policy in fraud cases involving “affirmative action” programs.
In this note, I will argue that the United States Sentencing Commission
(the “Commission”) should amend the calculation for loss under section
2B1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines to clarify that an individual who steals from
“affirmative action” programs will be liable for every dollar received from
the government, without any reduction for legitimate services rendered.9 In
Henning, supra note 3, at 34 (defining “amorphous victims” as “the market” or a
faceless organization that does not suffer in the same way one who is robbed or assaulted
would); see Christopher C. Reese, Note, A New Sentencing Blueprint: The Third Circuit
Allows Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud Convictions to Be Offset by Construction
Contract Performance in United States v. Nagle, 61 VILL. L. REV. 681, 681–88 (2016).
5
Henning, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that white collar crime and procurement fraud
implicates unseen harm).
6
See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 602 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying the
general loss rule); United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying
the government benefits rule).
7
See Harris, 821 F.3d at 602; Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1307.
8
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]; see also id. § 2B1.1 n.3(A) (2016).
9
See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
4
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the alternative, to avoid varying interpretations concerning whether the
Small Business Administration 8(a) (the “SBA”) and Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise (the “DBE”) programs are “government benefits,” the
Commission should add the following text to the enumerated list of examples
included in the 3(F)(ii) special rules:
Government benefits shall include “Small Business
Administration and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise grants or
any type of federal program payments enacted with the purpose of
giving exclusive opportunities to women businesses, minority
businesses, or businesses run by any class of disadvantaged
persons.”10
Lastly, until the Commission revises the Notes, the Supreme Court
should consider SBA 8(a) contracts and DBE grants to be “government
benefits” within the meaning of 3(F) for federal sentencing purposes.
First, this note will introduce the Commission, the Guideline comments
language, and provide a detailed explanation of the relevant rule provisions.
Part II will explore the history of the Commission, the specific comment
rules at issue, and the purpose of SBA 8(a) and DBE programs. Part III will
explain the various circuit court decisions regarding the Note application.
Fourth, the note will evaluate both sides of the circuit split and argue that
affirmative action procurement programs should be considered “government
benefits.” Finally, this will note argue that the Commission should amend
section 2B1.1(b)(1) to explicitly state that “affirmative action” government
contracts programs belong under the government benefits special rule under
3(F)(ii).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Congress Creates the Commission & the Guidelines
The United States Sentencing Commission, created by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, is an independent agency within the judicial branch.11 Congress tasked
the Commission with instituting “sentencing policies and practices for the
federal criminal justice system that will assure the ends of justice by
promulgating detailed guidelines, and prescribing the appropriate sentences
for offenders convicted of federal crimes.”12 The Commission includes seven

10

See id.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1–2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2004); Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, Title II, 98
Stat. 1976 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2008); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (outlining duties of the
Commission); see generally Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984).
12
Id.
11
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voting members (typically a combination of federal judges, federal
prosecutors, and legal scholars) and two ex officio non-voting members
(including representatives from the parole commission and the Attorney
General).13 Importantly, Congress espoused three overarching principles in
creating the Commission: (1) combat crime honestly through an effective,
fair system, (2) introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing
discrepancies in sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
offenders, and (3) sentence proportionally in a way that accounts for severity
of offenses and repeat offenders.14 The circuit split on whether to apply the
general loss rule or the government benefits rule should be resolved to
realign the sentencing rules with Congress’s three guiding principles.
B. Calculating the Proper Guidelines Sentence under United States v.
Booker
After an individual is convicted of a federal crime, federal courts apply
the Guidelines to determine the appropriate sentence and any potential
restitution owed by the convicted criminal.15 Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines
covers economic crimes including larceny, embezzlement, fraud, forgery,
and counterfeiting offenses.16 The Guidelines provide a sentencing structure
for federal courts while streamlining the mechanics of federal sentencing.17
In United States v. Booker, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Guidelines’ requirements are not mandatory, and appellate courts must
review federal sentences calculated under the Guidelines for
unreasonableness.18 The process by which federal courts apply the
Guidelines varies slightly among the circuit courts of appeals; however, the
Third Circuit’s three-step process serves as an instructive example of how
courts calculate an appropriate federal sentence in compliance with Booker.19
13

U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1–2; see 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008).
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, p.s.; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2008).
15
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2018); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
16
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2018).
17
Booker, 543 U.S. at 264; see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2018).
18
Booker, 543 U.S. at 261–63; see 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2018) (“No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person
convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence”).
19
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2015); see, e.g., United States v.
Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 374–77 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the district court may use a less
rigid federal sentencing procedure to bypass a “minefield of tricky determinations” so long as
the court arrives at the correct Guidelines sentencing range and explicitly weighs the required
§ 3553(a) factors); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 454–58 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that
the appropriate standard for calculating federal sentences under the Guidelines post-Booker
involves a four-step analysis where the district court must (1) properly calculate the
sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines; (2) determine whether a sentence within
that range and within the statutory limitations serves the factors set forth in § 3553(a), and, if
14
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In the Third Circuit, a district court calculated an appropriate sentence under
Booker by identifying the correct sentencing range under the Guidelines,
considering departure motions from the base offense level, and applying any
variances that may justify an increase or decrease in an individual’
sentence.20
In the Third Circuit, the three-step sentencing process begins with the
calculation of an applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.21 As
mentioned above, the Guidelines range functions as the starting point or the
“Base Offense Level” for a court to begin the sentencing calculation.22
Relevant to the analysis, the court examines “[t]he amount of loss that . . .
[a] defendant is found to have caused to determine the recommended
sentencing range under the Guidelines.”23 Second, after the court establishes
the base offense level, the district court considers departure motions.24 A
departure motion allows the court to consider “depart[ing] from the
applicable guidelines range” where “there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance . . .”25 Guideline departures, which must be carefully justified
and explained by the court, should only apply in “atypical case[s]” and the
Guidelines enumerate reasons for adjusting sentences upward or
downward.26 In government fraud cases, a court may find upward variations
for harm to unaccounted for property or crimes that cause a “significant
disruption of a governmental function.”27 In the final step of the sentencing
not, select a sentence that does serve those factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory
limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for selecting the particular sentence, especially
explaining why a sentence outside of the Guidelines range better serves the relevant
sentencing purposes set forth in § 3553(a)); United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d
Cir. 2011).
20
Id.
21
See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179 (citing Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308).
22
See id.
23
Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just
Sentencing Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1003 (2010)
(discussing the importance of loss calculation in determining the appropriate Guidelines range
in white collar crime sentencing).
24
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A)(U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2004) (prescribing departure process).
25
See id.; United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing step two
of sentencing calculation process where departure motions must be considered).
26
See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures
and Variances at 5 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt.
A(4)(b)) (describing application of departures and noting they should “only apply in the
‘atypical’ case lying outside the ‘heartland’ of conduct covered by the guidelines”); see also
id. at 4–40 (detailing overview of departures authorized by the Guidelines); see also Fumo,
655 F.3d at 308.
27
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures and
Variances at 19-20 (2018); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.5. provides for an upward departure if “the offense
caused property damage or loss not taken into account within the guidelines.”; see id. § 5K2.7
(stating that if the defendant’s conduct resulted in a “significant disruption of a governmental
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analysis, the district court must consider applying variances pursuant to the
statutory factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).28 Section 3553(a)
obliges courts to impose sentences that are “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary.”29 Federal courts may consider (among other things) the
following factors in imposing a sentence: (1) “the nature and circumstances
of the offense,” (2) the need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect of the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense,
and (3) the need for deterrence.”30 Overall, federal courts calculate an
appropriate sentence for financial crimes contained in section 2B1.1 by using
the range calculated in step one, adding or subtracting (via aggravating or
mitigating factors) departures in step two, and increasing or decreasing the
range to reflect any applicable variances.31
C. The Small Business Jobs Act and Section 2B1.1 Loss Rules Under
the Guidelines Applying to “Affirmative Action” Contract Fraud.
As illustrated above, Guidelines section 2B1.1 prescribes offense level
calculations for economic crimes including fraud and deceit.32 Within
section 2B1.1, subsection (A) provides the base offense level and subsection
(B) provides a detailed list of modifications for offense-specific
characteristics that can increase or decrease an offender’s base sentencing
level based on various aggravating and mitigating factors.33 In calculating
loss, the Guidelines provide for baseline loss and sentencing totals that may
be adjusted upward proportionally in cases where an increase in loss
increases the convicted criminal’s aggregate restitution owed and prison
term.34 Two of the most pertinent rules within section 2B1.1 for calculating
function,” the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range “to reflect
the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function
affected.”).
28
See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (explaining third step of sentencing process where “court
[must] consider[] the recommended Guidelines range together with statutory factors . . . and
determine[] the appropriate sentence . . .”) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 317
(explaining the difference between departures and variances where departures are deviations
from the Guidelines range based on “reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves,”
while variances are deviations “based on an exercise of the court’s discretion under [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a)”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (instructing courts on appropriate factors to consider for
imposing a sentence).
30
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (detailing several relevant factors courts should consider
in determining whether a variance may be applicable in the DBE/8(a) “affirmative action”
contract fraud context).
31
See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing a court’s responsibility at the third step of the
sentencing analysis).
32
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2015).
33
Id.
34
Id.
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sentencing totals for fraud in the “affirmative action” contract context
include (1) the general loss rule and (2) the government loss rules.35
1. The General Loss Rule in 3(A) & the Government Loss Rule
in 3(F)(ii)
In cases involving government contract fraud, the general loss rule
provides the starting point for the sentencing analysis.36 The general loss rule
applies to losses under subsection (b)(1) and states that “loss is the greater of
actual loss or intended loss.”37 The Notes define “actual loss” as “reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”38 Pecuniary
harm “means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable
in money.”39 Intended loss is defined as the pecuniary harm that offender
sought to inflict.40 In invoking the general loss rule, instead of the
government benefits rule, federal courts cite section 2B1.1 Note 3(A)(v)(II)
as the appropriate provision governing procurement fraud cases for fraud
related to a defense contract award.41 To that end, some judges apply Note
3(A)(v)(II) regardless of the nature, circumstances or purpose surrounding
the defense contract award.42
The government benefits rule, a special rule under Note 3(F)(ii) that
supplants the general loss rule, applies in cases involving “government
benefits” including fraud of grants, loans, and entitlement program
payments.43 In government benefits fraud cases, the Guidelines require that
“loss shall be considered to be not less than the value of the benefits obtained
by unintended recipients or diverted from intended uses.”44 In short, if a court
concludes that an offender’s fraud included “government benefits,” the loss
for sentencing purposes will be the entire total of the grant or contract
awarded without any mitigation for legitimate services rendered.45 As shown
above, the decision of whether to apply the general rule or the government
benefits rule plays a major role in determining an individual’s aggregate

35

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2016); see id. cmt. n.3(F).
36
Id. n.3(A).
37
Id.
38
Id. n.3(A)(i).
39
Id. n.3(A)(iii).
40
Id. n.3(A)(ii).
41
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2015) (Hardiman, J., concurring)
42
Id.
43
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 2016).
44
Id.
45
Id.
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sentence.46
2. Current Issues in Interpreting & Applying the Guideline Notes
Currently, there are varying interpretations of whether an “affirmative
action” government contract program constitutes a “government benefit.”
Furthermore, there are textual issues within the Guideline’s comments which
continue to frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by creating the
Commission. As stated by Congress, the Commission was founded to
“provide certainty and fairness” in sentencing, “[avoid] unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct,” maintain flexibility in sentencing
sufficient to “permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating
and aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general
sentencing practices,” and “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice
process[.]”47 Presently, the conflict between Note 3(E)(i), Note 3(F)(ii), and
the current comment’s language asserting that 3(F)(ii) applies
“notwithstanding subsection (A)” creates problems with consistent statutory
interpretation.48 Moreover, in cases involving SBA 8(a) defense contract
procurement fraud, courts may properly conclude that 3(A)(v)(II) applies in
cases of “procurement fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract
award.”49 If 3(A)(v)(II) applies, like 3(E)(ii), the general loss rule must be
used for calculating sentence severity and requires that the amount lost be
mitigated so that loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss, not the full
amount awarded under the contract.50
3. The “Affirmative Action” Government Programs at Issue:
Well-Intentioned Programs Exploited.
a. The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Joint Venture
Program
The SBA, created under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958,
exists to “ensure small businesses [receive] a ‘fair proportion’ of government
contracts.”51 Many fraud cases involve the 8(a) Joint Venture Program, a
46

See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (2016); see also id. n.3(A); see infra Part I.
28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008); see U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3 (2016).
48
See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016).
49
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II).
50
See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1; Harris, 821 F.3d at 608.
51
Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–699, § 102, 72 Stat. 689
(1958); About the SBA: The Founding of the SBA, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/history (last visited Dec. 17, 2018),; see 15
U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (containing a declaration of SBA policy); see also 15 U.S.C. § 661
47
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federal program which allows small businesses lacking the capability (due
to size and money) to perform contracts on their own, to enter into a joint
venture agreement with a larger, more capable, business to perform the
contract.52 Specifically, the Section 8(a) Joint Venture Program authorizes
the SBA to award federal procurement contracts to qualifying small
businesses.53 Under the 8(a) Joint Venture Program, participants can receive
up to four million dollars for goods and services and up to 6.5 million for
manufacturing ventures.54 To qualify for 8(a) contracts, a small business
“must be owned and controlled by one or more ‘socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals’” including women and minority owned
businesses.55 As such, the 8(a) program provides procurement opportunities
by acting as an “affirmative action” contracting program. 56 SBA attempts to
curb fraudulent joint venture arrangements by warning applicants that joint
venture approval may be denied where an 8(a) firm brings its 8(a) status and
little else to the joint venture.57 SBA actively monitors for fraudulent joint
ventures, and requires all parties under the Joint Venture Agreement to
specify how the division of labor requirements will be met, with businesses
owned by disadvantaged groups performing at least 40% of the work.58
Unfortunately, many businesses have stolen millions of dollars by
misrepresenting its 8(a) status or by joining with a non-8(a) business as a
matter of pretense, only to have the non-8(a) business complete most of the
contract work and reap most of the award dollars.59
b. The Department of Transportation’s Disadvantaged
Business Enterprise Program
The Department of Transportation (“DOT”), which requires (under
authority from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) any state that
receives federal transportation funds to set goals for participation by
(stating that the overall purpose and policy of Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is to
“improve and stimulate the national economy in general and the small-business segment
thereof in particular by establishing a program to stimulate and supplement the flow of private
equity capital and long-term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound
financing of their business operations and for their growth, expansion, and modernization,
and which are not available in adequate supply”).
52
See 13 C.F.R § 124.513 (2016).
53
15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A) – (B) (2016).
54
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, supra note 52.
55
15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2016); id. § 637 (a)(1)(C).
56
See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2016).
57
13 C.F.R § 124.513(a)(2).
58
13 C.F.R. § 124.513(d) (stating that the 40% labor division requirement became
effective in March 2011 where prior to that date, SBA regulations required that an 8(a) firm
complete a “significant portion” of the contract work, but no percentage was explicitly
specified); 13 C.F.R. § 124.513(c)(7).
59
See Moran, supra note 3.

SABO (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

1/16/2019 11:11 AM

AFFIRMATIVELY AMBIGUOUS

167

disadvantaged business enterprises in transportation construction projects,
remains susceptible to fraud and abuse.60 The DOT spends approximately
fifty-billion dollars annually on construction projects, and the government
requires that roughly ten percent of its construction budget, or five billion
dollars, be allocated to qualifying DBEs.61 A DBE is a for-profit small
business that “is at least 51% owned by an individual or individuals who are
both socially and economically disadvantaged and whose management and
daily operations are controlled by one or more of the disadvantaged
individuals who own it.”62 Additionally, states must announce DBE
participation goals and certify a business as a DBE prior to contract
bidding.63 To be considered a certified DBE, a business must “perform . . . a
commercially useful function on [the] contract.64 Therefore, like SBA 8(a)
requirements, a DBE whose “role is limited to that of an extra participant in
a transaction, contract, or project through which funds are passed in order to
obtain the appearance of DBE participation” does not qualify for DBE
participation.65 Regrettably, as with the SBA 8(a) program, the DOT’s DBE
program remains susceptible to fraud and abuse because individuals seeking
lucrative government contracts can creatively set up businesses and joint
ventures that use one party’s DBE status as a cover to receive federal funds.66
c. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 Statutory
60
49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014) (defining “socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals” to include African-Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans,
Hispanic Americans, and women among other classifications); 49 C.F.R. § 26.21 (2014); see
generally 49 C.F.R. § 26(A–C); 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–26.109 (2016); see also 23 U.S.C. § 324
(2012) (stating that no individual receiving federal assistance may be discriminated against
on the basis of gender under agency authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see
also George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
Programs, 17 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 423 (2007) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.3); see also
George R. La Noue, Western States’ Light: Restructuring the Federal Transportation
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 22 GEO. MASON. U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (citing
49 § U.S.C. 31105(f) (2012)).
61
See McVicker, supra note 3, at 4.
62
49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014); see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 261
(2000) (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting that minority and women subcontractors are frequently
subject to less traditional or obvious disadvantages “than direct, intentional racial prejudice”).
63
49 C.F.R § 26.81.
64
49 C.F.R § 26.55(c).
65
49 C.F.R § 26.55(c)(2).
66
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-89-26, HIGHWAY CONTRACTING:
ASSESSING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION’S
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (1988) (finding that contractors paid over
1 million dollars to settle fraud claims as a result of hundreds of DBEs being audited and
investigated for fraud, abuse, and waste); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 8–9 (stating the
largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 million
dollars over 15 years and 18.7 million dollar fraud perpetrated by steel company using phone
invoices).
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Presumption: A New Complication
The Small Business Jobs Act arguably creates a presumption that “loss”
in all small-business-fraud schemes must be the full value of the contract.67
Section (w)(1) states:
In every contract, subcontract . . . or grant which is set aside,
reserved or otherwise classified as intended for award to small
business concerns, there shall be a presumption of loss to the
United States based on the total amount expended . . . whenever it
is established that a business concern other than a small business
concern willfully sought and received the award by
misrepresentation.68
The statutory presumption in the law may appear straightforward, but
courts continue to struggle with how, or even if, the statutory language
interacts with the Guidelines’ command to credit loss in the sentencing
rules.69 The regulation implementing the presumption states, “it is SBA’s
intent that the presumption of loss shall be applied in all manner of criminal,
civil, administrative, contractual, common law, or other actions, which the
United States government may take to redress willful misrepresentation.”70
Congress initially intended to make the presumption “irrefutable,” but
ultimately did not do so because of due process concerns.71 However,
evidence suggests that Congress intended that the presumption only be
rebuttable in cases of unintentional error, technical malfunction, or other
similar situations.72 Therefore, courts have held that fully performing on an
illegally obtained contract cannot rebut the statutory presumption.73 The
Small Business Act presumption adds one more wrinkle in the already
confusing morass of assessing loss in the “affirmative action” contract
context.
III. CURRENT CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS INTERPRETATION &
APPLICATION OF THE RULES
In the absence of Supreme Court or Commission guidance on whether
67
See Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504; 15 U.S.C.
§ 632(w).
68
15 U.S.C. § 632(w)(1).
69
United States v. Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d 475, 485 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that
Congress may have created a clear statutory presumption that “it is not at all clear that
Congress intended for this presumption to supplant aspects of the Guidelines calculation that
the Commission has determined otherwise apply to yield to the total loss amount”).
70
Small Business Size and Status Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 38811–12, 38816 (June 28,
2013).
71
United States v. Singh, 195 F. Supp. 25, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2016).
72
See Small Business Size and Status Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 38811–12 (June 28, 2013).
73
See, e.g., Singh, 195 F. Supp. at 30–31.
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to apply the general loss rule or the government benefits rule to “affirmative
action” contract fraud cases, circuit courts continue to reach contradictory
conclusions that endangering Congress’s goal of crafting uniform and fair
federal sentencing guidelines. In all, two circuits, the Fifth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applies.74 Conversely, the
Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit apply the
government benefits rule, voiding any mitigation provisions in the general
rule.75 Finally, the Third Circuit in United States v. Nagle assumed that SBA
and DBE programs should be considered “government benefits,” but,
declined to resolve the issue definitively because the court concluded that
comment 3(E)(i) displaces 3(F)(ii) as currently written.76 Despite the Third
Circuit’s refusal to decide whether comment rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies to
DBE programs, the court applied 3(E)(ii) to mitigate the defendant’s
sentence.77 In sum, the Third Circuit reached a legally sound conclusion
given the Notes’ current statutory construction. However, the Nagle court’s
ruling exposes the need to immediately reform the Notes given the billions
of taxpayer dollars that remain vulnerable.
A. Circuits That Apply the General Loss Rule to “Affirmative Action”
Program Fraud Cases
In United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit decided whether to apply
the general loss rule or the government benefit rule in a fraud case involving
the SBA’s 8(a) Joint Venture Program.78 Harris, a retired Army Colonel who
worked for a non-8(a) firm that performed large-scale defense projects,
created a joint venture with an 8(a) SBA-approved business –Tropical and
Luster.79 Overall, the joint venture received three 8(a) contracts worth a total
of $1,317,593.51.80 Harris defrauded the federal government by joining with
Tropical and Luster to receive 8(a) status, but failing to give either of the
8(a)-qualified companies a significant role in the planning or execution of

74
United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Martin,
796 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015).
75
United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300,
321 (4th Cir. 2000).
76
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 181–83 (3d Cir. 2015).
77
Id.
78
Harris, 821 F.3d at 592.
79
Id. at 592–93.
80
Id. at 594–602 (applying the government benefits rule and determining that an offenselevel increase of sixteen levels was appropriate after having calculated the loss amount as
approximately $1.3 million. That loss amount encompassed “the total amount awarded under
both contracts,” “[n]ot including the payment corresponding to the count of wire fraud for
which [Harris] was acquitted”).
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the process, as the Guidelines require.81 In short, Harris flouted the
aforementioned SBA 8(a) regulations by paying Tropical and Luster 51% of
the project profits to “make everything look legitimate.”82 The District Court
for the Western District of Texas found Harris guilty on all counts, and he
challenged the loss calculation, which led to a two-level adjustment for his
role in the crime, a two-level adjustment for abusing a position of trust, and
a sixteen-level increase under section 2B1.1(a)(1).83 On appeal, Harris
argued that the government did not show that his business harmed the
procuring agencies, since the Joint Venture performed all contracted for
services.84 Harris also argued that the loss amount totaled zero, because
neither the 8(a) companies, nor the government suffered pecuniary harm as
a result of his actions.85 Finally, Harris argued that, in the alternative, the
court “can look to the gain from the scheme, which is also zero.”86 In reply,
the government argued on appeal that contracts awarded under the 8(a)
program are “government benefits” and subject to the 3(F) special rule where
the court should determine loss by adding the face value of the contracts with
no loss mitigation.87
The Fifth Circuit held that the 8(a) program did not constitute
“government benefits” under section 2B1.1, Note 3(F)(ii); therefore, defense
contract loss should be calculated under the general rule.88 The court
determined that “the general rule . . . [applies] [i]n the case of a procurement
fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract award.”89 The court further
stated that 8(a) procurement contracts do not constitute “government
benefits” because 3(F) only applies to grants, loans, and entitlement program
payments.90 To that end, although the enumerated list in 3(F) is not
necessarily exhaustive, the doctrine of noscitur a sociss canon asserts that an
enumerated list can only be expanded to entities sharing the common
features of the enumerated examples.91 Moreover, the court reasoned that
“while a government contract awarded under an affirmative action program
may be, in some sense, a ‘benefit,’ it does share any common features [of the
81

Id.
Id. at 596.
83
Id. at 597–98.
84
Harris, 821 F.3d at 603.
85
Id.
86
Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B)) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (“The court shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an
alternate measure of loss only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined.”).
87
Harris, 821 F.3d at 602.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 603; U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (2016).
90
Harris, 821 F.3d at 603.
91
Id.; Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 559–60 (2012) (describing the noscitur a sociis canon).
82
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enumerated list],” and it is a bargained for exchange, not a unilateral
transfer.92
Likewise, the court was not persuaded by its sister circuits who
concluded that the government benefits rule applied because “the mere fact
that a government contract furthers some public policy objective apart from
the government’s procurement needs is not enough to transform the contract
into a ‘government benefit’ akin to a grant or an entitlement payment
program.”93 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the loss amount should not be
the total contract price (as under 3(F)), but rather the “contract price less the
fair market value of services rendered by the Joint Venture to the procuring
agencies.”94 The court reasoned that, when calculating total loss under
Section 2B1.1(b)(1), 3(E)(i), the “[l]oss shall be reduced by . . . the fair
market value of the . . . services rendered.”95 The court held that note 3(E)(i)
applies broadly to all sections of Section 2B1.1(b) including loss under the
general rule.96 The Fifth Circuit joined the Third and Ninth Circuits in
concluding that if the Commission wanted 3(F)(ii) to apply to the general
rule in 3(A), the Commission would not have included rule 3(F)(v), which
requires that “loss to be reduced by the fair market value of services rendered
to the defendant.”97
In United States v. Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that “the sentencing
court [should] not use the entire amount of government contract dollars
awarded to defendant in calculating loss for fraud cases involving the SBA
8(a) program or the state-administered DBE contracts.”98 In this case,
defendant Martin owned a construction company (“MarCon”) that focused
on installing steel guardrails and concrete barriers on public highways.99
Over a seven-year period (1999-2006), MarCon “received nearly $20 million
from 85 contracts awarded through the DBE program, and successfully
performed each contract.”100 MarCon also received three contracts worth
nearly three million dollars from SBA programs.101 The federal government
caught Martin diverting profits made from the SBA and DBE programs to
accounts hidden from the IRS.102 By not reporting these profits, Martin
92

Harris, 821 F.3d at 603.
Id. at 604.
94
Id. at 605.
95
Id. at 605; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
96
Harris, 821 F.3d at 605.
97
Id.
98
United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 2015).
99
Id. at 1103.
100
Id. at 1104.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1103.
93
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avoided paying over $100,000 in income taxes.103 At sentencing, Martin
asserted that proper loss to the government was zero given that MarCon fully
performed on all contracts awarded to it.104 However, the district court found
pecuniary harm and applied the “procurement fraud rule” (the same rule as
the Fifth Circuit applied) found in Note 3(A)(v)(II) of section 2B1.1.105 In
reply, the government argued that the court should apply 3(F)(ii), and
concluded that the total loss amount equaled the total value of the contracts
totaling $22 million.106 The district court held that “the government benefits
rule” applied, but the court concluded that loss under the rule should be three
million dollars, the total profits earned by Martin.107
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit adopted Martin’s argument, holding that
the general rule applies to affirmative action contracts under the 3(A)(v)(II)
“procurement fraud rule.”108 As such, the court stated that 3(E)(i) applied so
that “[l]oss shall be reduced” by “the fair market value of . . . the services
rendered . . . by the defendant . . . to the victim before the offense was
detected.”109 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit first concluded that the
“procurement fraud rule” in 3(A)(v)(II) is the closest fit for this case because
the rule’s “placement within application note 3(A), rather than in note 3(F)
with the special rules, indicates that procurement fraud cases fall under the
general rule for calculating actual and intended loss.”110 The Ninth Circuit
further held that the “government benefits rule” did not apply because the
3(F) special rules apply “[n]otwithstanding [the general rules of] application
note 3(A).”111
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applied because
although “an ‘exclusive opportunity’ might be a benefit in some sense, . . .
the Guidelines’ focus on pecuniary harm” suggest that comment 3(F)(ii)
deals exclusively with unilateral government assistance such as food stamps,
and not fee-for-service business deals.112 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held
that the general rule applied because statutory interpretation requires that,
when interpreting examples in an enumerated list, all terms must include
similar characteristics to the enumerated list.113 The court further reasoned
103

Id.
Martin, 796 F.3d at 1104.
105
Id. at 1108.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Martin, 796 F.3d at 1110.
111
Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii)(v)) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
112
Martin, 796 F.3d at 1109.
113
Id. (citing Hamilton v. Madigan, 961 F.2d 838, 840 (9th Cir. 1992)).
104
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that if applying basic rules of statutory interpretation fails to illuminate the
correct result, the rule of lenity compels an interpretation in favor of the
defendant.114 The rule of lenity in statutory interpretation dictates that, where
Congress’s intent remains ambiguous and reasonable minds may defer as to
its intent, courts should adopt the less harsh interpretation of the Guidelines
punishment.115 Despite concluding that the 3(A) general loss rules applied,
the court noted that “DBE and SBA programs are designed to benefit
disadvantaged businesses.”116 The court further stated, “[i]t is conceivable
that the government paid a premium contract price”; however, any difference
between what the government paid versus the normal contract price is the
actual loss.117 Finally, the court conceded that there may be non-pecuniary
losses to the government in that Martin’s fraud may have harmed the
integrity of the programs and cheated law abiding DBEs out of potential
contracts.118 Nevertheless, the court concluded that non-pecuniary loss may
be properly assessed by the district court in applying the Guidelines under
the correct rule.119
In conclusion, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits applied the general loss rule
to “affirmative action” contract procurement fraud finding that either Note
3(E)(i) supersedes 3(F) in the defense contract fraud context or the
“[n]otwithstanding the general rules of application note 3(A)” language
precluded the application of the government benefits special rule in
3(F)(ii).120 Both circuits concluded that 3(F)(ii) did not apply by relying on
general principles of statutory interpretation,121 despite conceding that the
government “likely” paid a premium for the “affirmative action” contracts
and tacitly acknowledging that such contracts remain unique in the federal
contracting scheme.122
B. Circuits That Apply the Government Benefits Special Loss Rule to
“Affirmative Action” Program Fraud Cases
In United States v. Brothers Construction Co., the Fourth Circuit held
that the government benefits special rule applies in fraud case involving a
state-administered DBE program.123 In 1994, the West Virginia Department
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

See United States v. Leal-Felix, 665 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011).
Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1112.
United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2016); Martin, 796 F.3d at

1110.
121
122
123

Harris, 821 F.3d at 603.
Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111.
United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 321 (4th Cir. 2000).
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of Transportation, Division of Highways (“WVDOH”) solicited bids for a
$5.2 million DBE project.124 Two business partners (Tri-State) contracted
with Brothers Construction (a certified DBE) to work on a local highway
project. After winning the DBE contract, no Brothers employees appeared
on the job site at any point during the construction.125
The district court convicted Tri-State and Brothers of defrauding the
government by scheming to divert DBE funds to a non-DBE business.126
Brothers and Tri-State argued that the sentencing court erred in concluding
that under Section 2F1.1. Note 7(d), “[i]n a case involving diversion of
government program benefits, loss is the value of benefits diverted from
intended recipients or uses.”127 Brothers and Tri-State further argued that loss
to the government was zero because all contracts were performed by other
certified DBEs.128 Thus, defendants argued that the project received required
DBE performance, and the WVDOH received what it bargained for.129
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit applied the now-nonexistent Section 2F1.1.
Note 7(d) government benefits rule to the DBE fraud without explanation.130
In United States v. Leahy, the Seventh Circuit held that a city ordinance
meant to direct contracts to minority (“MBEs”) and women-owned
businesses (“WBEs”) constituted an “affirmative action” program under
Note 8(d) (the current 3(F)), and thus required sentencing to be based on the
total contract dollars awarded, with no mitigation for services rendered.131
The ordinance, like the DBE requirements, mandated that an MBE or
minority group must own 51% of the company and one or more minority
members must be involved in day-to-day management.132 After Chicago
passed the ordinance, James Duff set up a business with his mother (Green
Duff) to qualify for WBE status.133 An investigation revealed that, although
Green Duff technically owned all the company stock, she had no real
involvement with the business’s management.134 Over the course of the
company’s fraud scheme, Duff received over $100 million dollars in state
and federal grants.135 Defendants argued on appeal that “the only loss
124

Id. at 304.
Id. at 306.
126
Id. at 318.
127
Id. at 317.
128
Id. at 308 (imposing no fine on Brothers Construction Co. because the company was
insolvent).
129
Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d at 318.
130
Id. at 317.
131
United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006).
132
Id. at 779.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 780–81.
125
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Chicago suffered was to its regulatory interests—an intangible right
unprotected by these statutes.”136 In the alternative, the defendants argued
that the Note governing contract procurement applied, rather than the
government benefits rule.137 Both parties agreed that Guidelines 2F1.1
applied to this case.138 Yet, the district court determined that the appropriate
loss number should total the amount of profits gained, not the entire contract
dollars awarded.139 The Seventh Circuit, citing a former city official’s
testimony, concluded that the Chicago city ordinance at issue was “an
affirmative action program whose fruits were reserved for fledgling minority
and women businesses.”140
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the government benefit
rules applied because:
[T]he goal of Chicago’s program was fundamentally
frustrated, . . . “it [was] a double loss, the loss that we computed
and the real loss to all people that [did not] get this business, that
[did not] get a chance to become [a] successful [MBE] or [WBE],
because this huge amount was diverted.”141
The court held that the government benefits rule applies, instead of the
general loss rule because the ordinance states, “[a]n effect to direct contracts
to [MBEs] and [WBEs] is required to eradicate the effects of
discrimination.”142 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that “the correct amount
under application note 8(d) is the value of the benefits diverted, which was
over $100 million.”143
In United States v. Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit held that special rule
3(F)(ii) applies because “CSBE and DBE programs are government benefits
programs under § 2B1.1 of the [Guidelines].”144 A Florida grand jury
indicted Maxwell on twenty-four counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering, and other conspiracy charges.145 At issue were six contracts
funded by Miami Dade County (the “County”) that required compliance with

136

Id. at 786.
Leahy, 464 F.3d at 790.
138
Id. at 789.
139
Id. at 789 n.3 (“Duff was a highly-experienced businessman who easily made
substantial profits off the MBE/WBE contracts and paid the surplus to family members and
associates who performed little or no work for the various entities under contract.”).
140
Id. at 779 (“[the city ordinance] was a program to assist those companies to win
contracts with the City in a competitive situation and become economically viable so that
they . . . could compete with prime contractors.”).
141
Id. at 789 n.3.
142
Id. at 790.
143
Leahy, 464 F.3d at 790.
144
United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).
145
Id. at 1288.
137
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the County’s Community Small Businesses Enterprise (“CSBE”).146 To
receive a CSBE contract, the CSBE must “perform a commercially useful
function in the completion of the contract.”147 A CSBE performs a
“commercially useful function” when it “actually performs, manages, and
supervises the work involved.”148 Overall, the CSBE contracts at issue
demanded the same requirements as the federal DBE contracts previously
discussed.149 Once the local government approves CSBE status, the
contractor must submit a Schedule of Participation and Monthly Utilization
Reports to certify compliance with CSBE and DBE work requirements.150 At
sentencing, Maxwell objected to the court’s total calculated loss at seven
million dollars, because “he was not personally awarded the contracts, he did
not benefit from the contracts, and Fisk (his non-CSBE business partner who
did all the work and remitted payment to the certified CSBE) made only a
small profit on the contracts.”151 On appeal, Maxwell challenged the district
court’s loss amount calculation under section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines.152 The
government requested a loss amount of $7,974,674, the total amount of all
CSBE and DBE contracts awarded.153 The district court, without adopting
either parties’ argument, concluded that total loss was six percent of the total
contracts awarded because six percent was the average profit margin on
government electrical subcontracts.154
The Eleventh Circuit held that the DBE and similar programs are
“government benefits” that fall under the special rules.155 The court reasoned
that “DBE and similar program[s] aimed at giving exclusive opportunities to
women and minority businesses” makes them entitlement payments, one of
the enumerated examples in 3(F)(ii).156 “Unlike standard construction
contracts, these contracts focus mainly on who is doing the work.”157
Therefore, by applying 3(F)(ii), the “appropriate amount of loss here should
have been the entire value of the CSBE and SBE contracts that were diverted
to the unintended recipient.”158
146

Id.
Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Cty. Ordinance § 1033.02 (1997); 49 C.F.R. § 26.55(c)(1)
(2014).
148
Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1288 (citing Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Cty. Ordinance § 1033.02;
49 C.F.R. § 26.55(c)(1)).
149
Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1306.
150
Id. at 1289 n.2 (citing Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., Admin. Order 3-22 as amended).
151
Id. at 1294–95.
152
Id. at 1305.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1306.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
147
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In United States v. Nagle, the Third Circuit held that under the
Guidelines’ standard definition of loss, defendants were liable for the total
value of DBE contracts, minus services and performance pursuant to the
contracts.159 Nagle and Fink owned a non-DBE manufacturing and
contracting business called Schuylkill Products, Inc. (“SPI”).160 Later, SPI
entered into a joint venture with Marikina, a company owned by Cruz, a
Filipino man who worked on various DBE transportation projects.161 When
Marikina won the DBE contract, SPI would perform all the work on the
contract and distribute the profits among the three partners.162 The district
court concluded that, under section 2B1.1., the defendants owed the face
value of the contracts without mitigation for work performed.163 Defendants
argued that the district court should have used Note 3(A) to calculate loss
instead of 3(F)(ii) because “the DBE program is not a ‘government benefit’
and, therefore, whether not they should receive a credit for completing the
subcontracts.”164 In the alternative, defendants claimed that “they are
nonetheless entitled to credit under Note 3(F)(ii).165 In reply, the government
asserted that the 3(F) “government benefits rule” applied making loss the
total face value of the contracts.166 Importantly, the Third Circuit did not rule
on whether a DBE contract is a “government benefit,” since, irrespective of
whether 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies, the court held that defendants owed the full
value of the contracts with credit for fair market value of services
provided.167
The Third Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applies under
3(A) and 3(F) as currently drafted.168 If the 3(A) standard analysis applies,
the loss defendants must pay back includes the total contract value minus the
fair market value of performance and raw materials provided.169 Regarding
whether the 3(F)(ii) applied, the court concluded that “the Government’s
position [was] persuasive particularly in light of the goals of the DBE
program,” namely who the program focuses on, and the emphasis on

159

United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 171.
161
Id.at 171–72.
162
Id. at 171; 49 C.F.R. § 26.21–81 (2014); see Definition of a Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, https://www.transportation.gov/civilrights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise/definition-disadvantaged-business-enterprise (last
visited Dec. 18, 2018).
163
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179.
164
Id. at 180.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 181.
167
Id. at 180–81.
168
Id. at 180–81.
169
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 181.
160
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benefitting those who perform the work.170 Furthermore, the court hinted that
the special rule could apply, stating that the DBE program “assumes that
performance of a contract allows a DBE to not only earn a profit on the deal
but also to form connections with suppliers, labor, and others in the industry.
The profit earned, therefore, is not the only benefit the DBE obtains when it
receives the contract.”171 Accordingly, when the parties “fraudulently
received the [DBE contracts], the DBE program assumed that all of the
contract price was going towards benefiting a true DBE.”172 The court
concluded that if Note 3(F)(ii) applies, the proper loss amount is the total
face value of the contracts.173
Overall, even if 3(F)(ii) applies in this case, the subsection is overridden
by 3(E)(i), based on the Comment’s current text.174 Despite assuming that
DBE contracts constitute “government benefits,” the Third Circuit held that
“Note 3(E)(i) requires a credit against the full face value of the contracts
[regardless as whether 3(A) or 3(F)] applies.]”175 Here, Note 3(E)(i)
establishes that “the fair market value of the property returned and services
rendered, by . . . the defendant [] shall be credited against the loss.”176 In
reply to 3(E)(i), the government argued in Nagle that defendants are not
entitled to credit because “as non-DBEs they did not ‘render any valuable
services’” and 3(E)(i) does not apply to 3(F)(ii).177 The court disagreed,
ruling that 3(E)(i) applied to 3(F)(ii) for two reasons: the 3(F) special rules
apply “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A),” and 3(F)(v)(II) states that “loss
shall include the amount paid for the property, services or goods transferred,
rendered or misrepresented, with no credit for provided for the value of those
items or services.”178 Notably, the court stated that “[h]ad the [Commission]
intended to preclude crediting services render against loss for Note 3(F)(ii),
it would have used similar language as it used in Note 3(F)(v)(II).” 179 In
conclusion, the Third Circuit held that 3(E)(i) and 3(F)(ii) function together
and require mitigation of the total loss to the government regardless of which
rule applies.180
Judge Hardiman, concurring in Nagle, concluded that courts should
170

Id. at 181.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 181.
175
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 181.; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.
3(E)(i) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
176
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 182.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
179
Id.
180
Id. at 183.
171
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calculate DBE fraud using the procurement fraud rule in Note 3(A), not the
government benefits special rule.181 Judge Hardiman reasoned that
defendants “committed classic procurement fraud” by lying about
“compliance with federal regulations in order to receive contracts that would
have otherwise gone to others.”182 Furthermore, the Guidelines clearly state
that the 3(A) general rule applies to fraud procurement, with 3(A)(v)(II)
dictating how 3(A) should be applied in such cases.183 Therefore, 3(F)(ii)
should apply only in fraudulent receipt of welfare payments and has “no
place in a procurement fraud case.”184 The current circuit split involving
whether rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies to fraud in the SBA and DBE programs
continues to divide courts and frustrate Congress’s goals in creating the
Guidelines Notes; therefore, Note 2B1.1. should be amended to provide
fairness, continuity and notice to all defendants that defrauding the
government will be met with a severe, predictable punishment formula.
C. The D.C. Circuit: A Circuit at Odds with Itself
In United States v. Singh, Judge Walton, writing for the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, held that the loss to the
government under fraudulently procured 8(a) contracts should be calculated
based on the full value of the contracts awarded.185 From 2000 to 2009, Singh
served as the Vice President of “Company A”, a construction firm that
specialized in renovating and altering buildings.186 After Company A
graduated from the SBA 8(a) program on January 12, 2009, a second
company, “Company B”, submitted an 8(a) application for certification.187
In June 2009, Company B named Singh as a Vice President of Company B
and “entered into a Mentor/Protégé Agreement” with Company A.188 Over a
two and a half year period, the government awarded Company B twenty-six
8(a) contracts totaling $8,533,562.86.189 During that period, Company B
maintained only one employee who actually performed work on the 8(a)
contracts.190 However, during that period, Singh engaged in activities and
directed others to: replace Company A property with Company B logos, use
Company B email accounts when corresponding with the government
regarding Company B contracts, represent to the GSA that Company A
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 183–84 (Hardiman, J., concurring).
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 184.
Id.
Id.
United States v.Singh,195 F. Supp. 3d 25, 26 (D.D.C. 2016).
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.

SABO (DO NOT DELETE)

180

1/16/2019 11:11 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

employees represented Company B on certain jobs, and provide to GSA
representatives employee lists for Company B that actually included
individuals employed by Company A.191 Overall, Company A’s profits
totaled at least $90,397.15 and Singh received personal compensation of at
least $28,768.28.192
After discussing the section 2B 1.1(b) loss calculation guidelines and
surveying the government benefits rule contained in Note 3(F)(ii), the court
held that the correct loss total should be considered as the full value of the
contracts fraudulently awarded to Singh.193 The court in Singh agreed with
the reasoning of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, based on the
presumption in favor of loss as the total contract value codified in the Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010.194 In the Small Business Jobs Act, Congress
codified the presumption in part as, “[i]n every contract . . . which is set
aside . . . there shall be a presumption of loss to the United States based on
the total amount expended on the contract” whenever a small business
contract received an award by fraud.195 The court found the presumption to
clearly indicate Congressional intent on how loss should be calculated and
determined that Congress reaffirmed the presumption in the federal register
as one that will be utilized in all criminal federal court proceedings. 196
Although the court recognized that presumptions may generally be rebutted,
the court noted that no statute or regulation permits such a rebuttal in these
circumstances.197
The Singh Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding in United
States v. Martin, which asserted that total loss should be mitigated based on
services rendered because the rule of lenity that remains a rule of last resort
in statutory interpretation, does not apply to unambiguous statutes with clear
presumptions.198 Moreover, the court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and
191

Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 28.
Id.
193
Id. at 30.
194
Id.
195
Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 30 (citing Pub. L. No. 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010));
United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Leahy, 464
F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 317–18 (4th
Cir. 2000); 15 U.S.C. § 632(w)(1) (2012); 13 C.F.R. § 121.108(a) (2016).
196
See Small Business Size and Status Integrity, 78 Fed. Reg. 38811, 38812–16 (June 28,
2013) (“[I]t is SBA’s intent that the presumption of loss shall be applied in all manner of
criminal . . . actions, which the United States government may take to redress willful
misrepresentation.”) (emphasis added).
197
See 13 C.F.R. § 121.108(d) (2016) (stating that the presumption may only be rebutted
“in the case of unintentional errors, technical malfunctions, or other similar situations that
demonstrate that a misrepresentation of size was not affirmative, intentional . . . or willful . . .
under the False Claims Act.”).
198
United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2015); Singh, 195 F. Supp.
3d at 31.
192
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the Fifth Circuit’s similar conclusion in United States v. Harris because both
Circuits failed to consider the statutory presumption contained in section
632(w)(1).199 Finally, the court concluded that the Third Circuit’s holding in
Nagle (agreeing with the Martin and Harris courts) does not affect its
reasoning because the Nagle decision concerned the DOT’s DBE program,
not the SBA’s 8(a) program.200 In conclusion, the court, consistent with the
presumption codified in the Small Business Jobs Act, calculated loss to the
government under the Guidelines’ to be $8,533,562.86, the total amount of
the contracts awarded to Singh.201
Just ten months later, in United States v. Crummy, Judge Jackson, also
writing for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
arrived at the opposite conclusion of Singh.202 The court in Crummy held that
in an 8(a) fraud case, loss to the government should be calculated by
subtracting the total contract price from the fair market value of services
rendered, irrespective of the statutory loss presumption contained in the
Small Business Jobs Act.203 MCC Construction Company, a general
contractor ineligible for 8(a) certification, retained Company 1 (“C1”), an
8(a) certified subcontractor specializing in renewable energy contraction
programs.204 MCC and C1 defrauded the government by entering into
“teaming agreements” that allowed C1 to nominally serve as the prime
contractor on projects.205 Although MCC and C1 complied with 8(a)
regulations on paper, the teaming agreements allowed Crummy and MCC to
use C1 to filter 8(a) reserved projects to MCC in violation of 8(a)
certification parameters.206 Through this process, the government awarded
Crummy and MCC/CI two Coast Guard contracts valued at over one million
dollars.207
In Crummy, the court found the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in United
States v. Harris to be persuasive. To that end, the court held that the total
loss amount for purposes of section 2B1.1(b)(1) was zero after the mandatory
application of the credits against loss provision contained in Application
Note 3(E).208 Furthermore, the court held that even if the statutory
presumption in the Small Business Act applies, it may be overcome by the
199

United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2016); Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 31–

32.
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d. at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
United States v. Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d 475 (D.D.C. 2017).
Id. at 476.
Id. at 478.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 478–79.
Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 481.
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credits against loss provision within the application notes.209 The court
embraced Harris’ reasoning that the SBA 8(a) program does not constitute a
“government benefit” because the “mere fact that a government contract
furthers some public policy objective” is insufficient to transform the
contract into a government benefit.210 If the 8(a) program does not constitute
a “government benefit,” the court concluded that Application Note 3(E)
applies because “to conclude otherwise would be to ignore the fact that the
[Sentencing] Commission defines ‘actual loss’ for section 2B1.1(b)(1)
purposes as the “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from
the offense.”211 Mitigating loss under 3(E) “properly focuses the loss inquiry
on the pecuniary impact of the victims[.]”212 The court noted that the
government’s loss will not always be zero because it may be appropriate to
apply the procurement fraud rule in note 3(A)(v)(II) that allows for loss to
include “reasonably foreseeable administrative costs” to remedy the fraud.213
Finally, the court held that the Small Business Jobs Act presumption
contained in section 632(w) did not indicate that Congress intended to
displace the Guidelines calculation for total loss.214 The presumption does
not mandate that sentencing judges disregard Note 3(E) that states “loss shall
be reduced by . . . the fair market value . . . of services rendered.”215 The
court noted that the presumption fits within the Commission’s statutory
framework by establishing a presumptive loss total as the entire contract
awarded, but that the loss total may be reduced by Note 3(E) in cases such
as this where “it is difficult to conceive of the government’s true pecuniary
loss as the entire amount of the Section 8(a) contract.”216
The Crummy court used a nuanced analysis to distinguish this holding
from its previous precedential holding in Singh less than a year prior. Judge
Jackson noted that to the extent her decision conflicts with Singh, “the
undersigned respectfully disagrees” with Singh’s analysis and conclusion.217
Judge Jackson, after acknowledging the circuit split on the loss calculation
issue, wrote that 8(a) program contracts should not be considered
“government benefits” for the purposes of loss calculation. Judge Jackson
209

Id. at 482.
Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 603–04 (5th Cir. 2016).
211
Id. at 482 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1. cmt. n.3(a)(i) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2016)) (emphasis added).
212
Id. at 483 (citing Harris, 821 F.3d at 606).
213
Id. at 484 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (2016)); see United States v.
Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2015) (Hardiman, J., concurring) (applying
procurement fraud note 3(A)(v)(II) instead of 3(E) to mitigate loss and reach the same result).
214
Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 485.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 486.
217
Id. at 486–87.
210
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found Singh’s analysis unpersuasive because the Singh opinion failed to
mention Note 3(E) entirely, and Singh “was primarily concerned about the
manner in which the presumptive loss amount may be rebutted” versus the
issue in Crummy of whether Note 3(E) may be applied in an 8(a) fraud
case.218
IV. IMPLICATIONS & ANALYSIS
Billions of dollars remain at risk due to an individual’s ability to
defraud the government contracting process due to lax sentencing rules.219
This risk makes the need to resolve the current circuit split and begin federal
sentencing reform in “affirmative action” government contracts of the
utmost importance. To address the current circuit split, the Commission
should revise the Notes to ensure that criminals who illegally exploit
government programs can be held accountable for the full amount of money
awarded by the government, regardless of the benefits or services provided.
A. The Origin of the Problem: A Significant Change to the Guidelines
Within the Last Decade Creates the Need for Urgent Reform to
Clarify Federal Sentencing Rules and to Return to Congress’s
Original Goals of Maintaining Uniformity and Fairness in
Federal Sentencing.
In Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he
Guidelines Manual’s commentary which interprets or explains a guideline is
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”220
Moreover, the court asserted that the “[G]uidelines commentary, interpreting
or explaining the application of a guideline, is binding on [the Court] when
we are applying that [G]uideline because we are obligated to adhere to the
Commission’s definition.”221 Significantly, in 2001, the Commission merged
the government benefits special rule under section 2F1.1 into section
2B1.1.222 The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits based their decisions
on the now non-existent section 2F1.1 in holding that SBA and DBE
218

Id. at 487.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RCED-89-26, HIGHWAY CONTRACTING:
ASSESSING FRAUD AND ABUSE IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION’S
DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM (1988) (finding that contractors paid over
1 million dollars to settle fraud claims as a result of hundreds of DBEs being audited and
investigated for fraud, abuse, and waste); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 8–9 (stating that
the largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 million
dollars over 15 years).
220
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
221
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 43.
222
United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 605 n.12 (5th Cir. 2016).
219
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programs should be considered government benefit programs.223
Specifically, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits based their decisions on the
1997 and 1998 Guidelines under the former section 2F1.1, which did not
require that loss be reduced by fair market value of services rendered akin to
current rule 3(E)(i).224 The Commission later consolidated section 2F1.1 with
section 2B1.1 in the 2001 Guidelines.225 The Guidelines rule change was
noteworthy because the old rule 2F1.1 contained a provision similar to
current rule 3(F)(ii) (which both courts relied on), but no rule allowing loss
mitigation resembling 3(E)(i).226 If the Comments cannot be amended, the
Supreme Court should hold that “affirmative action” contract programs are
“government benefit” programs to reconcile decisions made under the old
rules with the new rules.
B. Re-Evaluating United States v. Harris: The “Government
Benefits” Special Rule and Congressional Intent Weakened
If the Fifth Circuit had properly interpreted the Guidelines under the
noscitur a sociss doctrine, the court should have applied the government
benefits special rule to calculate loss instead of the general loss rule. The
noscitur a sociss doctrine, Latin for “it is known by the company that it
keeps,” is a concept frequently employed in interpreting statutory
construction.227 The Fifth Circuit held that the general loss rule applied and
that the noscitur a sociss doctrine precluded 8(a) programs from being read
into the enumerated examples listed in 3(F)(ii).228 Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit erred in applying the general loss rule for three reasons.
First, the Fifth Circuit’s previous application of the government
benefits rule in United States v. Dowl on similar facts undermines its decision
in United States v. Harris. In Harris, the Fifth Circuit cited the four types of
programs to which it had previously applied the government benefits rule for

223

Id. (“The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, confronted with similar facts, have
declined to reduce loss by the value of services provided, but each court’s analysis was
embedded in the language of the government benefits rule that we hold does not apply); see
United States v. Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d 300, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying 1997
Guidelines); United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying 1998
Guidelines); United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305–07 (11th Cir. 2009).
Furthermore, [these cases] were decided under the former U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2F1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1998), which did not contain an application
note requiring that loss be reduced by the fair market value of services rendered akin to current
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i) (2016)”).
224
Harris, 821 F.3d at 605.
225
See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt. n.8(d) (1998).
226
Id.
227
See Scalia & Garner, supra note 91, at 195–98 (describing the noscitur a sociis canon
as a principle of statutory interpretation).
228
Harris, 821 F.3d at 602–04.
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sentencing.229 Specifically, the court previously applied the 3(F)(ii)
government benefits special rule in cases involving: EPA grants, SBA loans,
FEMA disaster relief reimbursements, and Medicare reimbursements.230 In
Dowl, the Fifth Circuit held that the government benefits rule applied when
the “[defendant] submitted fraudulent applications [with the SBA’s disaster
assistance loan program] to obtain government funds” and later spent them
inappropriately.231 The court applied the government benefits special rule in
3(F)(ii) because the defendant’s scheme “deprived the Government of the
funds’ economic value for aiding homeowners’ rebuilding efforts after
Hurricane Katrina.”232 While the disaster assistance loan in Dowl did not
reserve funds for a racial minority or women, the court noted –similar to 8(a)
fraud –that the scheme diverted government money from the intended
recipients to the defendant.233 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Harris, like
Dowd, should have applied the government benefits special rule because in
each case, the defendant diverted funds reserved for a government specified
recipient to an unintended recipient causing the government a double-loss.234
Second, in United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit erred in relying on
the noscitur a sociss doctrine when it concluded that the SBA 8(a) Joint
Venture program did not share common features with the 3(F)(ii)
enumerated list because defense contracts require a “bargained for
exchange” and a mutual transfer of benefits.235 Indeed, the court
acknowledged that an “affirmative action” contract program may benefit the
recipient; however, the court stated that the three examples in 3(F)(ii) involve
“a unilateral transfer,” not a “bargained-for exchange.”236 The court,
invoking the noscitur a sociss doctrine, ultimately held that the government
benefits rule did not apply because “unlike the enumerated examples,
contracts awarded under the 8(a) program do not exist primarily to benefit
the awardee; rather, such contracts first and foremost serve the government’s

229

Id.
United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 521–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (contemplating EPA
grants); United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 560–61 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing FEMA
disaster relief reimbursement payments); United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 502–04 (5th
Cir. 2010) (considering SBA loans); United States v. Jones, 475 F.3d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 2007)
(analyzing Medicare reimbursements).
231
Dowl, 619 F.3d at 502.
232
Id.
233
Id. (emphasis added).
234
See United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that the 3(F)(ii)
applies because stealing from the DBE program implicates a “double loss” to the government
including “the loss that we computed and the real loss to all people that [did not] get
[affirmative action contract] business, that [did not] get a chance to become [a] successful
[MBE] or [WBE], because this huge amount was diverted”).
235
United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 603 (5th Cir. 2016).
236
Id.
230
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own procurement needs.”237 The reality remains just the opposite. 8(a)’s
purpose indirectly allows the government to fulfill its procurement needs.
Yet, Congress expressly instituted 8(a) and DBE programs to benefit the
awardee directly by providing minorities and women a fair chance in the
marketplace where minorities historically retained no opportunities or in
some cases where minorities and women continue to realize stifled business
opportunity.238
Third, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the 3(A) general rule applies
to “affirmative action contracts” because they neither involve traditional
consideration, nor the bargaining context of private contracts, overlooks the
nature of how individuals receive such contracts.239 Unlike traditional
contracts that require consideration to be valid, a business can receive 8(a)
contracts by simply filling out a form with basic information, the job to be
completed, and certification that the business complied with the statute’s
SBA minority work requirements.240 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit conceded, and
Congress explicitly provided, that 8(a) Joint Venture contracts may be “won
through competition,” as in through a competitive bidding process, or noncompetitively on a “sole source” basis, where the government awards a
contract because only one business meets the government’s bidding
criteria.241 As a result, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, 8(a) and DBE
237
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(2)(B) (“[R]equiring that each federal agency’s annual
goals for the participation of disadvantaged small businesses in the agency’s procurement
contracts ‘shall realistically reflect the potential of . . . small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals . . . to perform such
contracts’”)).
238
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 217 (2000) (per curiam)
(“Congress has adopted a policy that favors contracting with small businesses owned and
controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged”); see also 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15
(stating objectives of DBE Program are, among other things, “to ensure nondiscrimination in
the award and administration of DOT-assisted contracts,” to create a level playing field for
DBEs, and to “assist the development of firms that can compete successfully in the
marketplace outside the DBE program”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (stating, among
other things, that it is the policy of Congress to aid, counsel, and assist small businesses in
their competitive enterprises and assist such businesses to compete in international markets);
13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2018) (stating that the “purpose of the SBA 8(a) [Business Development]
program is to assist eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the American
economy through business development.”); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that
taxpayers are impacted when public funds are allocated contrary to congressional intent).
239
Harris, 821 F.3d at 591–92.
240
Id.; see generally 13 C.F.R. § 124.201– 07 (2018).
241
Harris, 821 F.3d at 591–92; 13 C.F.R. § 124.501 (2016); National Association of State
Procurement Officials, Non- Competitive / Sole Source Procurement: Seven Questions,
BRIEFING PAPER 1, 3 (Jan. 2015), http://www.naspo.org/solesourceprocurement/7Question_Sole_Source_Procurement_briefing_paper-1-13-15.pdf (defining sole source
contract procurement as “any contract entered into without a competitive process, based on
the justification that only one known source exists or that only one single supplier can fulfill
the requirements”).
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contracts frequently involve a unilateral transfer of public taxpayer money –
on a “sole source” basis –to an applicant without traditional contract
negotiations or legal consideration similar to EPA grants, SBA loans, FEMA
disaster relief reimbursements, and Medicare reimbursements.242 Moreover,
in contrast with United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Lopez previously held that defrauding a federal contract program [the JavitsWagner-O’Day Act or “JWOD”] designed to employ blind and disabled
individuals constituted a loss under the government benefits rule.243 In
Lopez, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the government benefits rule applied
when Lopez directed only nine percent of the contract award to the intended
disabled or blind recipients.244 Although Lopez did not involve racial-based
affirmative action goals, the court held that the government benefits rule
nevertheless applied because “[t]he focus in the JWOD program is on
providing employment opportunities for the severely disabled, not on the
specific product or service provided.”245 For example, the government
benefits special rule in the 3(F)(ii) list states that the rule applies to “(e.g.,
grants, loans, entitlement program payments).”246 As stated above, and
contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, 8(a) and DBE programs could be
reconciled with the noscitur a sociss doctrine and be identified as unilateral
grants or “program payments” due to the unilateral nature of procurement
procedures, the lack of consideration exchanged between parties, and the
bargaining dynamics involved. Therefore, if a federal contract program to
specifically benefit the disabled constitutes a “government benefit,” so too
should 8(a). In conclusion, given the holdings in Lopez and Dowl, and
Congress’s explicit intent in creating the SBA and DBE programs, the
government benefits special rule enumerated example list should be
construed broadly to include SBA 8(a) and DBE programs.
C. Applying the Government Benefits Special Loss Rules for
Defrauding “Affirmative Action” Government Contracts Will
Promote Fairness, Re-Invigorate Congress’s Public Policy
Goals, Deter Potential White Collar Criminals, and Send a
Strong Message to the Public That Stealing from the Government

242

See United States v. Nelson, 732 F.3d 504, 521–23 (5th Cir. 2013) (analyzing EPA
grants); United States v. Hebron, 684 F.3d 554, 560–61 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting FEMA disaster
relief reimbursement payments); United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 502–04 (5th Cir. 2010)
(discussing SBA loans); United States v. Jones, 475 F.3d 701, 705 (5th Cir. 2007)
(considering Medicare reimbursements).
243
United States v. Lopez, 486 F. App’x 461, 463 (5th Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential).
244
Id.
245
Id. at 467.
246
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2016); Harris, 821 F.3d at 602.
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and Disadvantaged Businesses Will Not Be Condoned.
In the interests of public policy and fairness, the Commission should
amend the Notes to ensure that defrauding an “affirmative action”
government program results in a loss equal to the entire contract award
without mitigation. Specifically, the public policy purposes for 3(F)(ii), to
ensure maximum punishment for stealing from the government and
taxpayers, should not be circumvented or frustrated by Note 3(E)(i) or Note
3(F)(v)(II), as currently written. To remedy the situation, the Commission
should revise the sentencing rules to ensure that criminals who illegally
exploit government programs are held accountable for the full amount of
money awarded by the government regardless of any benefits or services
provided. Moreover, “affirmative action” contract programs should be
considered “government benefits” because Congress created such programs
to enforce a government policy favoring socially disadvantaged individuals
in the marketplace.247 Finally, Congress explicitly created the Commission
to “combat crime honestly through an effective, fair system.” 248 To realize
Congress’s goals, fairness demands that anyone who defrauds a government
“affirmative action” program should be sentenced under 3(F)(ii) to guarantee
that the loss will be the entire contract total awarded just as if the criminal
defrauded Medicare, the EPA, or welfare benefits.
“Affirmative action” contract programs should also be considered
“government benefits,” in order to strengthen and reassert deterrence
interests in federal sentencing. The theory of deterrence in criminal law relies
on the assumption that fear of punishment will influence potential criminals
not to break the law.249 To increase deterrence, the Commission should
amend the Guidelines’ text for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) in
order to clarify that the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii)
applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current
language stating that special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision
247

See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 217 (2000) (“Congress has
adopted a policy that favors contracting with small businesses owned and controlled by the
socially and economically disadvantaged.”); see 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–15 (stating objectives of
DBE Program are, among other things, “[t]o ensure nondiscrimination in the award and
administration of DOT-assisted contracts,” “[t]o create a level playing field” for DBEs, and
to “assist the development of firms that can compete successfully in the marketplace outside
the DBE program”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 631 (2018) (stating among other things that it is the
policy of Congress to aid, counsel, and assist small businesses in their competitive enterprises
and assist such businesses to compete in international markets); 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2018)
(stating the “purpose of the [SBA] 8(a) [Business Development] program is to assist eligible
small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the American economy through business
development”); see also McVicker, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that taxpayers are impacted
when public funds are allocated contrary to congressional intent).
248
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, introductory cmt. (2016).
249
Deterrence Theory, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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(A).”250 Amending the Notes in this manner will standardize punishments
and deter individuals that defraud government “affirmative action” programs
regardless of whether a business fully performs a contract. The Notes should
be reformed because a federal court’s ability to mitigate loss under
3(F)(v)(II) or 3(E)(i) undermines the deterrence role and the recognition of
non-pecuniary loss envisioned by the drafters of 3(F)(ii). Congress created
the Commission to “introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing discrepancies in sentences imposed for similar crimes committed
by similar offenders.”251 Uniformity—where courts treat all individuals
similarly and with fair notice—increases deterrence, since all individuals
know that they will receive a harsher penalty for a given offense.252
Consequently, the existing circuit split on the issue of “affirmative action”
government programs undermines the benefits of deterrence provided by
uniform sentencing and the goals set forth by Congress in creating the
Commission and the Guidelines.253 In the context of economic crimes, the
symbolism of higher prison terms “is important [in deterring white collar
crime or contract procurement fraud] because the strongest possible message
should be sent to those who would engage in similar conduct that they will
be caught and punished to the full extent of the law.”254
The Notes should also be amended to address specific deterrence and
general deterrence to maximize the deterrent effect on individuals that may
consider stealing from the SBA and DBE programs.255 Critically, amending
the Notes will deter federal courts from “succumbing to the impulse to see
[white collar] defendants in the warm light of a contrite individual who
engaged in aberrational conduct but is unlikely to offend again.”256 In the
alternative, even if higher sentences do not reduce fraud crime directly,
greater prison time may “deter judges from going to one extreme or the
other” . . . because higher sentencing “requires consideration of the impact
on society and not solely the particular offender.”257 Furthermore, higher
standardized punishments will promote deterrence in sentencing of
individuals who steal from “affirmative action” contracts because fraud in

250

See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2016).
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, introductory cmt. (2016).
252
See Henning, supra note 3, at 27–28.
253
See id. at 56–58; U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, introductory cmt. (2016).
254
Henning, supra note 3, at 28.
255
See id. at 31 (stating that specific deterrence concerns deterring a specific defendant,
while general deterrence seeks to deter those criminals similarly situated from engaging in
future crimes because the cost of potentially committing the crime exceeds the benefit of
attempting or succeeding in committing the crime).
256
Id. at 32 (citing Stanton Wheeler, Kenneth Mann & Austin Sarat, SITTING IN
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 10 (Yale Univ. Press 1988).
257
Id. at 58.
251
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such cases involves substantial non-pecuniary loss to amorphous victims.258
Therefore, to achieve maximum deterrence, the Commission should amend
the Guidelines to vindicate non-pecuniary loss to the government, taxpayers
and “amorphous victims” including the small business contract procurement
market.259 In government fraud cases, many defendants plead that there is no
loss to the government or society because the defendants performed all
contractual obligations.260 To eliminate such defenses, defendants should be
liable for the full price of a contract award because “[i]t is conceivable that
the government paid a premium contract price above what it would pay for
other contracts under normal competitive bidding procedures.”261 Therefore,
the amended Guidelines should recognize that loss to the government
includes a double loss: the loss to taxpayers and the excess funds the
government paid to a DBE or 8(a) business to realize Congress’s policy goals
of aiding minority and women owned businesses.262
Public policy further demands that defendants be responsible for the
entire contract award because “[defendant’s] fraud harmed the integrity of
the [8(a) and DBE] programs, which were designed to help legitimately
disadvantaged businesses. There may also be harm . . . to legitimate program
participants whose businesses might have received the contracts that were
awarded to [defendant].”263 The government should be reimbursed fully for
the traditional loss as well as the latent loss to allow the recouped funds to
flow back into government coffers with the goal of aiding legitimate, law
abiding minority applicants. Principally, reform will aid the market writ
large and other “amorphous victims” affected by white collar contract
fraud.264 As the Guidelines recognize that “there may be cases in which the
offense level determined under [section 2B1.1] substantially understates the
seriousness of the offense,” the Notes should be reformed to account for the
invisible, non-pecuniary loss involved in fraud of SBA and DBE
programs.265 Further examples of non-pecuniary loss caused by DBE
program fraud include discouraging potential legitimate disadvantaged
258

Id. at 33–34.
See McVicker, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing consequences of DBE fraud where DBE
fraud is unique because it prevents real DBEs from “grow[ing]and build[ing] their businesses”
and from “gain[ing] crucial experience”).
260
See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015). (noting that,
on appeal, defendant Martin claimed that there was no net “loss” and no “non-pecuniary loss”
because MarCon performed the contract completely and adequately).
261
Id.
262
United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 789 (7th Cir. 2006).
263
Martin, 796 F.3d at 1111.
264
Henning, supra note 3, at 34 (explaining that “the market” or a faceless organization
may be affected by “affirmative action” contract fraud without society, traditional
stakeholders or citizens noticing the impact).
265
Id.
259
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businesses from entering the DBE program and preventing actual recognized
DBEs from graduating from the program.266 In sum, the Commission should
amend the Guidelines for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to
clarify that the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) applies
“notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating
that special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A)” to standardize and
deter individuals that defraud government “affirmative action” programs
regardless as to whether a business fully performs a contract. 267
D. The Way Forward: Preventing the Nagle Outcome Through
Reasonable Reform
United States v. Nagle embodies the model case study to examine how
the Guidelines remain fundamentally flawed without reform. Based on the
current text, the Third Circuit reasonably interpreted the Notes in applying
3(A)(v)(II) and 3(E)(i) instead of 3(F)(ii) to “affirmative action” contract
fraud.268 Regrettably, the Third Circuit’s decision “weakened prosecutor’s
chances of successfully seeking [longer] prison sentences when the court
allowed offsetting for contractual performance . . . in calculating . . .
‘loss.’”269 An examination of United States v. Nagle reveals three current
textual issues that undermine the purpose of 3(F)(ii). First, 3(F) currently
states “Special Rules “Notwithstanding subdivision (A).”270 This provision
undercuts special rule 3(F)(ii) by providing that the government benefits
special rule only supersedes the subsection (A) general loss rule. Second,
several circuit courts mitigated loss using 3(F)(v) (covering
misrepresentation schemes) or using 3(A)(v)(II) (involving fraud of defense
contracts).271 Because many SBA 8(a) and DBE fraud cases involve Defense
Department contracts, the general rule in 3(A) robs 3(F)(ii) of its purpose.
Given that “affirmative action” contracts remain dissimilar to traditional
contracts, there is no rational reason why defense contracts under 8(a) or the
DBE should be treated differently than all other 8(a)/DBE construction and
transportation contracts.
Third, several circuits reasonably concluded that mitigating rule 3(E)(i)
“Credits Against Loss” note applies to reduce a criminal’s total “loss.”272
266
267

McVicker, supra note 3, at 7; Leahy, 464 F.3d at 789.
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N

2016).
268

United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 168, 183 (3d Cir. 2015).
Reese, supra note 4, at 681.
270
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (2016); see Nagle, 803 F.3d at 181–83.
271
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 183 (Hardiman, J., concurring); United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d
589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2015).
272
Harris, 821 F.3d 589; Martin, 796 F.3d at 1104 ; U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i)
(2016).
269
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Despite the Third Circuit assuming that DBE contracts constituted
government benefits regardless as to whether 3(A) or 3(F) applies, the court
held that defendants owed the full value of the contracts with credit for fair
market value of services provided under section 3(E)(i).273 As a result,
section 3(E)(i) and the current “[n]otwithstanding Subsection A” language
frustrates the goals of 3(F)(ii) even if, as in Nagle, the court assumes that the
DBE program constitutes a “government benefit.”274 Thus, to resolve the
textual issues in the Notes, the Commission should amend the Guidelines for
calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government
benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions
(A–E)” instead of the current language stating that special rules apply
“notwithstanding subdivision (A).”275 Amending the Notes in this manner
will clearly indicate that the 3(E)(i) “Credits Against Loss” provision does
not supersede the 3F special rules. Adding this clarifying language will
harmonize the Notes with the statutory presumption codified in the Small
Business Act in 2010. Although none of the circuit courts to address the issue
discussed the presumption and its potential interaction with the Notes, the
fact that two federal district courts in the D.C. Circuit Court recently came
to two opposite conclusions on whether the presumption applies emphasizes
the need for immediate clarification. After the sentencing rules are clarified,
any federal court that concludes that SBA 8(a) and DBE programs constitute
government benefits programs will be bound to apply the 3(F)(ii) special loss
rules in lieu of the general loss rule in sub-section (A). Requiring the
application of 3(F)(ii) will ensure that a criminal who steals from any
“affirmative action” program will be responsible for the full contract price
awarded without mitigation for any legitimate services rendered.276
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission should amend the Guidelines for calculating loss
under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule
under 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the
current language stating that special rules apply “notwithstanding
subdivision (A).”277 With differing circuit interpretations on how to apply
the Notes and the uncertainty surrounding the Small Business Jobs Act
statutory presumption, it is imperative that the Commission amend the Notes
to ensure that the government benefits rule applies to all SBA and DBE
affirmative action programs. The lack of clarity regarding which rules apply
273
274
275
276
277

United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 168, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 181.
See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(B)(1) (2016).
See id.
See id.
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to “affirmative action” contracts continues to exacerbate the discrepancies in
sentencing, while eroding the benefits of such programs to the individuals
who rightfully deserve financial help in their businesses. Until the
Commission amends the Notes, the Supreme Court should hold that SBA
8(a) and DBE programs comprise government benefits to provide guidance
and certainty in federal sentencing for white collar crimes.
This note scrutinizes the background of the Commission, the relevant
rules at issue and the various circuit court cases that resolved the issue.
Likewise, this note offers a feasible solution to revive the principle that
defrauding government benefits consistently comes with a steep price.
Although opponents may suggest that Congress intended to create flexible
guidelines for federal courts, a district court imbued with too much
sentencing discretion will ultimately lead to injustice, diluted deterrence, and
disparate outcomes across the nation. In conclusion, this note proposes
reasonable solutions to re-calibrate federal sentencing with Congress’s
original goals and give fair notice to offenders that they will be liable for
everything they steal from the people.

